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In spatial games players typically alter their strategy by imitating the most successful or one randomly se-
lected neighbor. Since a single neighbor is taken as reference, the information stemming from other neighbors
is neglected, which begets the consideration of alternative, possibly more realistic approaches. Here we show
that strategy changes inspired not only by the performance of individual neighbors but rather by entire neigh-
borhoods introduce a qualitatively different evolutionary dynamics that is able to support the stable existence
of very small cooperative clusters. This leads to phase diagrams that differ significantly from those obtained
by means of pairwise strategy updating. In particular, the survivability of cooperators is possible even by high
temptations to defect and over a much wider uncertainty range. We support the simulation results by means of
pair approximations and analysis of spatial patterns, which jointly highlight the importance of local information
for the resolution of social dilemmas.
Cooperative behavior is extremely important, both in the
animal world as well as across human societies [1–4]. Yet it is
also an evolutionary puzzle, as it is costly but has no immedi-
ate individual benefits, except in rare exceptions, for example
when cooperation is agreed upon as a risk-sharing mechanism.
How cooperation evolved amongst selfish and unrelated indi-
viduals is therefore still ardently investigated, as evidenced by
recent reviews [5–10].
Evolutionary game theory [11–13] provides an apt theoret-
ical framework to address the subtleties of the evolution of
cooperation. One of the most popular games that is represen-
tative for situations constituting a social dilemma is the pris-
oner’s dilemma game [1]. It can be summarized succinctly.
Two individuals have to decide simultaneously whether they
wish to cooperate or not. Cooperator pays a cost c towards the
mutual benefit b where b > c > 0, while defector contributes
nothing. This yields the temptation to defect T = b, reward
for mutual cooperationR = b− c, punishment for mutual de-
fection P = 0, and the sucker’s payoff S = −c, which for the
prisoner’s dilemma game thus satisfy T > R > P > S and
2R > T + S. Evidently, for an individual it is best to defect
regardless of what the opponent does. As rational players are
aware of this, they both defect, in turn obtaining P rather than
R, hence the social dilemma [14].
Several mechanisms that facilitate the evolution of cooper-
ation are known. Nowak summarizes five rules [6], which are
kin selection [15], direct reciprocity [16], indirect reciprocity
[17], group selection [18], and network reciprocity [19]. Net-
works in particular, have received substantial attention in the
recent past [7]. While scale-free networks appear to provide
the best environment for the evolution of cooperation [20–27],
small-world [28–32] and hierarchical networks [33–35] also
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received ample attention. Largely motivated by the discovery
that complex networks facilitate the evolution of cooperation,
heterogeneity in general has emerged as an important property
that may help keep defectors in the minority [36–39]. Coevo-
lutionary games [10], where the structure of the network was
subject to evolution just as the strategies of players have been
studied thoroughly too [40–54], with the prevailing conclu-
sion being that this may give rise to robust cooperative states
and lead to socially preferable interaction networks in a spon-
taneous manner. Quite remarkably, this has recently been con-
firmed empirically [55], although very extensive experiments
also indicate that the human behavior may suppress network
reciprocity [56, 57].
In fact, how human decision-making affects the evolution
of cooperation is of particular relevance for the present work.
Szabo´ et al. [58] have recently considered a special type of
strategy updating. Instead of players exclusively caring only
about their own payoffs when updating their strategies, they
investigated what happens when a pair of randomly chosen
neighboring players tries to maximize their collective income
by simultaneously updating their two strategies. It was re-
ported that the proposed strategy update rule produces the an-
tiferromagnetic ordering structure of cooperators and defec-
tors on the square lattice at sufficiently low noise intensities,
and that this favors the evolution of cooperation more than
the traditional pairwise imitation updating. Human decision-
making dynamics has also been investigated experimentally,
whereby we are particularly interested in the so called “social
influence” effect reported by Lorenz et al. [59]. As stated in
their paper, social influence among group members plays an
important role in individual decision-making.
One may then ask how this affects the evolution of coop-
eration? To address this question, we propose an adaptive
strategy-adoption rule in which the social influence is taken
into account. In particular, as a proxy for the social influence
we assume that the decisions the players make are affected
2FIG. 1: Fraction of cooperators ρC as a function of the cost-to-benefit
ratio r, as obtained for K = 0.1 [panels (a) and (b)] and K = 0.83
[panels (c) and (d)]. Results presented in panels (a) and (c) were ob-
tained by means of Monte Carlo simulations, while those presented
in panels (b) and (d) were obtained by means of pair approximation
(see Methods section for details). Figure legend indicates whether
pairwise or locally influenced strategy updating was used.
by all their neighbors, not just a single randomly selected or
the most successful neighbor. Players can collect information
from their neighbors, and moreover, their decision-making
is more likely to be affected by the circle of “close friends”
rather than the whole social environment. We introduce this
so-called local influence to the strategy updating simply so
that, before a potential update, each player considers the av-
erage performance of its own strategy and that of the other
strategy, if present, within its neighborhood. As we will show
in what follows, this introduces a qualitatively different evo-
lutionary dynamics that is able to support the stable existence
of very small cooperative clusters, which in turn supports the
survivability of cooperative behavior even under very unfa-
vorable conditions. Besides simulation results [60], we will
also present results obtained with pair approximation meth-
ods, which are, along with the game theoretical model, accu-
rately described in the Methods section.
Results
We begin by presenting the fraction of cooperators ρC as a
function of the cost-to-benefit ratio r = c/b at two tempera-
tures, namely at K = 0.1 and K = 0.83. The usage of the
latter value is motivated by recent empirical research from be-
havioral science [61], although essentially, as we will show
in what follows, the temperature, i.e., the level of uncertainty
by strategy adoptions, does not play a decisive role. Results
for both the pairwise and locally influenced strategy updat-
ing are presented in Fig. 1(a,c). It can be observed that for
K = 0.1 the evolution of cooperation is promoted across the
whole applicable span of r if the traditionally used pairwise
strategy updating is replaced by the proposed local influence
FIG. 2: Full K − r phase diagrams, as obtained by means of Monte
Carlo simulations [panels (a) and (c)] and by means of pair approx-
imation [panels (b) and (d)]. Upper red (lower blue) lines denote
the boundaries between the mixed C +D and homogeneous D (C)
phases.
based strategy updating. ForK = 0.83, however, the outcome
is a bit less clear-cut. While pairwise imitation fails to sus-
tain cooperative behavior at such high values of r as locally
influenced strategy updating, it is nevertheless more apt for
achieving complete cooperator dominance. As we will show
in what follows, it is indeed the case that locally influenced
strategy updating often fails to completely eliminate defectors
at small values of r, yet it opens up the possibility of survival
of cooperators even under harsh defector-friendly conditions.
These simulation results can be corroborated by results
of pair approximations (see Methods for details), which we
present in Fig. 1(b,d). The general trends are predicted cor-
rectly, although as expect, the beneficial effect of network
reciprocity [19] at low values of r are underestimated. It is
worth mentioning that the pair approximation is in general
more accurate for larger values of K [62], and indeed it can
be observed that the agreement with simulation results is bet-
ter for K = 0.83 than it is for K = 0.1. In particular, for
K = 0.83 the pair approximation method correctly predicts
the occurrence of an intersection point [compare panels (c)
and (d)]. Altogether, results of pair approximations corrobo-
rate the conclusion that the survivability of cooperators, espe-
cially at high values of r, is substantially promoted by locally
influenced strategy updating.
Further adding to the robustness of this conclusion are re-
sults presented in Fig. 2(a,c), where we present full K − r
phase diagrams for both considered updating rules. It can be
observed that the positive impact of local influence on the evo-
lution of cooperation persists across large regions of K . On
the other hand, the presented phase diagrams also evidence
more clearly the failure of the proposed updating rule to lead
to an absorbing C phase. Moreover, there is a notable quali-
tative difference in the critical behavior that is evoked by the
updating rule. By focusing on the D → C +D phase bound-
3aries, it can be observed that for pairwise strategy updating
there exists an optimal value of K at which cooperators thrive
best. Note that theD → C+D phase boundary is bell-shaped,
indicating that K ≈ 0.3 is the optimal temperature at which
cooperators are able to survive at the highest value of r. For
strategy updating based on local influence, however, this fea-
ture is absent. The D → C +D phase boundary is in fact an
inverted bell, indicating the existence of the worst rather than
an optimal value of K . Notably, the results for pairwise strat-
egy updating are in agreement with previous works [62–64],
where it was shown that the lack of overlapping triangles, as
is the case for the square lattice as well as for random regu-
lar graphs, introduces an optimal uncertainty for the evolution
of cooperation. Conversely, the results obtained by consid-
ering local influence suggest that the system is behaving as
if overlapping triangles were in fact present in the interaction
network. Note that in the latter case an optimal K for the
evolution of cooperation does not exist. This leads us to the
conclusion that the interaction network is effectively altered
when the local influence is taken into account. In particu-
lar, triplets of players that are not connected by means of the
original interaction graph (the square lattice) become effec-
tively connected through the joint participation of players in
the same local groups (neighborhoods) that are subject to the
same local influence. An identical effect was indeed observed
by the study of the public goods game [65], where triplets
also became effectively connected because of the participa-
tion of players in the same groups. Below, we will provide
further evidence concerning the effective linkage of triples of
players, which is essentially a side effect of locally influenced
strategy updating. Another interesting observation is that the
parameter region of the mixedC+D phase in general widens
as K increases, which is in contract to the results obtained by
means of pairwise strategy updating.
We have also constructed full K − r phase diagrams by
means of pair approximations. Figure 2(b,d) features the ob-
tained results, from which it follows that qualitative features,
compared to the simulation results, are again captured fairly
accurately, although the extent of the parameter region of
the mixed C + D phase is overestimated. Expectedly, the
predictions are also less accurate near the phase boundaries,
which is because the pair approximation does not take into
account loops nor does it take into account long-range corre-
lations, which however, have a noticeable effect especially in
the vicinity of critical transitions [66].
In order to obtain an understanding of the reported observa-
tions, we proceed with the presentation of characteristic spa-
tial patterns, as obtained for both pairwise and locally influ-
enced strategy updating, in Fig. 3. Regardless of which update
rule is applied, cooperators form compact clusters by means of
which they are able to exploit the mechanism of network reci-
procity [19]. If the value of r is small, the clusters are larger
and more compact than for higher values of r. On the other
hand, the spatial patterns emerging under the two update rules
also have noticeable dissimilarities. Foremost, given a value
of r, pairwise strategy updating yields larger clusters than lo-
cally influenced strategy updating, even if the density of co-
operators is approximately the same [compare panels (a) and
FIG. 3: Characteristic snapshots of spatial patterns formed by co-
operators (blue) and defectors (red) under pairwise imitation [(a)
r = 0.004, (b) r = 0.019] and under strategy updating based on lo-
cal influence [(c) r = 0.004, (d) r = 0.221]. The size of the square
lattice was 100 × 100 and K = 0.83. (a) In this snapshot there
are 77 clusters, ranging in size from a single cooperator to 3042 co-
operators, with a weighted average size of 1925.21. The stationary
fraction of cooperators is ρC ≈ 0.52. (b) In this snapshot there are
99 clusters, ranging in size from a single cooperator to 162 coopera-
tors, with a weighted average size of 70.01. The stationary fraction
of cooperators is ρC ≈ 0.19. These characteristics are significantly
different in the bottom two snapshots. (c) In this snapshot there are
439 clusters, ranging in size from a single cooperator to 427 coopera-
tors, with a weighted average size of 137.69. The stationary fraction
of cooperators is ρC ≈ 0.52. (d) In this snapshot there are 164 clus-
ters, ranging in size from a single cooperator to 19 cooperators, with
a weighted average size of 6.63. The stationary fraction of cooper-
ators is ρC ≈ 0.05. Note that in snapshots (a) and (c) the densities
of cooperators for both update rules are practically identical, while
nearer to the extinction thresholds [panels (b) and (d)] they differ
quite significantly.
(c)]. Nearer to the extinction threshold the stationary densities
differ, yet the difference in the spatial patterns the two rules
generate becomes most apparent [compare panels (b) and (d)].
The visual inspection of the characteristic spatial patterns
invites a quantitative analysis of the exposed differences, the
results of which are presented in Fig. 4 separately for both
updating rules. It can be observed that, in general, as r in-
creases, the cluster size decreases. The number of clusters, on
the other hand, is maximal at an intermediate value of r. Con-
crete r values, however, differ significantly for the two consid-
ered strategy updating rules. In particular, by pairwise strat-
egy updating both the clusters size and the number of clusters
are shifted significantly towards lower values of r. One rea-
son is obviously that pairwise strategy updating simply does
not support the survivability of cooperators by as high val-
4FIG. 4: Macroscopic properties of cooperative clusters in the depen-
dence on the cost-to-benefit ratio r. Cluster size (a) and cluster count
(b) are depicted for pairwise and locally influenced strategy updat-
ing. In both cases the cluster size decreases as r increases, while the
cluster count reaches a maximum at a certain value of r and then de-
creases. Note that for pairwise imitation a minimum cluster size of
about 76.18 is required for cooperators to survive. Taking into ac-
count the local influence of the neighbors reduces this to 6.61. The
depicted results were determined in the stationary state on 100×100
square lattices and by using K = 0.83. Error bars indicate the stan-
dard deviation.
ues of r as locally influenced strategy updating. Nonetheless,
the fact that for any given value of r, where comparisons are
possible, the typical cluster size obtained with pairwise strat-
egy updating is much larger than the one obtained with lo-
cally influenced strategy updating begets the conclusion that
there are significant differences in the way cooperators clus-
ter to withstand being wiped out by defectors. Note that for
cooperators to survive under pairwise updating the minimally
required cluster size is ≈ 76.18, while for locally influenced
updating it is only 6.61. Moreover, for pairwise strategy up-
dating the cluster size decreases much faster, which speaks in
favor of the increased stability of the clusters under locally
influenced strategy updating.
To confirm these conjectures, we present in Fig. 5 two typ-
ical C-cluster configurations and analyze the survivability of
cooperators separately for each particular case. For the sake of
simplicity but without loss of generality, we consider for the
following analysis only theK → 0 limit. Then if the payoff of
each cooperator along the boundary is larger than that of each
defector in its neighborhood, we are allowed to conclude that
such a C-cluster will survive. For the left C-cluster pattern in
Fig. 5 under pairwise updating, the payoffs of a cooperator C
(PC ) and defector D (PD) along the boundary are
PC = 2 and PD = 1 + 4r, (1)
respectively. For locally influenced updating, however, the
average payoff of cooperators (P¯C ) and the average payoff of
defectors (P¯D) along the boundary are given by
P¯C = 2 and P¯D = 1 + 4r, (2)
respectively. Thus for such aC-cluster pattern to survive, both
update rules lead to r < −0.25. Indeed, neither locally influ-
enced nor pairwise strategy updating support the survivability
of such a pattern. Performing the same analysis for the config-
uration on the right, however, yields a different outcome. The
payoff of a cooperator C2 (PC2) on the boundary and that of
the two types of defectors D1 and D2 (PD2 and PD1 ) are
PC2 = 1, PD1 = 2 + 4r andPD2 = 1 + 4r, (3)
respectively. For locally influenced updating the correspond-
ing payoffs are
P¯C =
5
2
and P¯D =
5
3
+ 4r. (4)
Accordingly, we find that under pairwise updating the con-
dition for survivability is r < −0.25, while under locally
influenced updating it is only r < 524 . Hence, locally influ-
enced strategy updating can warrant the survivability of co-
operators when grouped in this way, while pairwise updating
can not. Note also that theC-cluster configuration on the right
of Fig. 5 is the smallest one which can persist in the popula-
tion under the most hostile conditions under locally influenced
strategy updating. Based on this analysis, we can in fact es-
timate the extinction threshold r = 524 ≈ 0.21 in the limit
K → 0, and indeed we find excellent agreement between this
analytical approximation and the simulation results presented
in Fig. 2(c).
With these insights, we argue that local influence based
strategy updating can support the survivability of cooperative
behavior only if the core of the C-cluster is isolated from de-
fectors (compare left and right configuration of Fig. 5), be-
cause cooperators along the boundary can then gain a higher
level of support from the cluster and thus protect themselves
against being exploited by defectors. In previous works,
where only pairwise strategy updating was considered, indi-
vidual players were concerned only with their own payoffs
when updating their strategies. However, if individuals are ex-
posed to the local influence, i.e., they care about the average
performance of the strategies in their neighborhood, coopera-
tors can benefit not only from their own payoffs, but also from
the payoffs of their cooperative neighbors. In this sense, lo-
cally influenced strategy updating further strengthens the link-
age between cooperators within cooperative clusters, and so
cooperators can reciprocate with each other on a profounder
and altogether more effective level.
In terms of the robustness of the described mechanism to
variations of the interaction network, our preliminary investi-
gations indicate that cooperation is always promoted on regu-
lar small-world networks with different rewiring probabilities
5FIG. 5: Schematic presentation of two representative cooperative
(blue) clusters surrounded by defectors (red). The cluster depicted
left has no chances of survival under pairwise or locally influenced
strategy updating. The cluster on the right, however, cannot prevail
under pairwise imitation, but can do so under locally influenced strat-
egy updating. This is because the core of the cooperative cluster (C1
in the figure) is quarantined from defectors in case imitation proceeds
according to local influence (see main text for details).
[67], as well as on scale-free networks [68] provided the pay-
offs are normalized with the number of neighbors [25]. If the
payoffs on scale-free networks are not normalized with the
number of neighbors [20], the promotion of cooperation due
to local influence, compared to the traditional pairwise strat-
egy updating, may be compromised. Additional research is
needed, however, to clarify conclusively the potential nega-
tive impact of strongly heterogeneous degree distributions on
the newly identified mechanism for the promotion of coop-
eration. It would also be of much interest to clarify the role
of zero-determinant strategies [69, 70], which point to major
paradigm shifts in the resolution of social dilemmas.
Discussion
Summarizing, we have analyzed the impact of “local influ-
ence” on the evolution of cooperation in the spatial prisoner’s
dilemma game. Instead of the performance of a single neigh-
bor, players considered the average performance of the two
strategies within their neighborhoods. We have shown that
by going beyond the traditionally assumed pairwise strategy
updating, the evolution of cooperation can be promoted. We
have determined full K − r phase diagrams by means of sim-
ulations and pair approximation methods, which both indicate
that this effect is robust against uncertainty by strategy adop-
tions. Moreover, the phase separation lines indicate that the
consideration of local influence effectively changes the inter-
action network as an optimal K is no longer inferable. This is
characteristic for interaction networks with overlapping trian-
gles [62, 64], which are obviously not part of the square lattice
topology that we have employed. By analyzing the macro-
scopic features of emerging spatial patterns as well as the sur-
vivability of typical cooperative clusters, we have provided
further insights as to how the consideration of local influence
changes the evolutionary dynamics.
Lastly, it is worth relating the presently considered strategy
updating rule to previous game-theoretical models. By the
win-stay-lose-shift rule [32, 71–74], for example, each indi-
vidual has an aspiration according to which it judges whether
or not to change strategy. The aspiration, however, is tradi-
tionally assumed to be constant. In our case, on the other
hand, we relax this assumption by considering the aspiration
as a dynamical quantity. Note that the average payoff of the
strategy that is not adopted by the focal player can in fact be
regarded as the aspiration level. This in turn implies that here
the aspiration depends on the outcome of the game, and hence
is subject to change. Moreover, the present rule can be re-
garded as a learning rule. The difference from the traditional
single role model learning rule is that in the present case the
strategy update depends not on the comparison of a pair of in-
dividuals, but on the comparison of two groups of individuals,
each involving several individuals adopting the same strategy.
Overall, we hope that these considerations, and in particu-
lar the consideration of local influence and the “wisdom of
crowds” [59, 75, 76], will motivate further research aimed at
promoting our understanding of the evolution of cooperation.
Methods
Mathematical model
Players are located on the vertices of a L×L square lattice
with periodic boundary conditions. Each individual is initially
designated either as a cooperator C or defector D with equal
probability. For the pairwise imitation strategy updating rule
[77] (we use the label “pairwise” in the figure legends when
applying this rule), Monte Carlo simulations of the game are
carried out comprising the following elementary steps. First, a
randomly selected player x collects its payoff Px by interact-
ing with its four nearest neighbors. For the purpose of payoff
evaluation, it is worth introducing unit vectors S = [1, 0]T
and [0, 1]T for cooperators and defectors, respectively. The
payoff matrix is
M =
[
1 0
1 + r r
]
,
where r ∈ (0, 1) is the cost-to-benefit ratio. The payoff of
player x is thus
Px =
∑
z∈Γ(x)
STxMSz, (5)
where Γ(x) represents its neighborhood. Subsequently, one
randomly chosen neighbor y of player x also acquires its pay-
off Py identically as previously player x.
After the evaluation of payoffs, players consider changing
their strategies. In particular, player x adopts the strategy Sy
of the randomly selected neighbor with the probability
T (Py − Px) =
1
1 + exp[(Px − Py)/K]
, (6)
where K is the uncertainty by strategy adoptions [7]. If the
local influence is taken into account (we use the label “local”
6in the figure legends when applying this rule), however, the
elementary steps are as follows. First, we randomly choose
a player x with the strategy Sx. Next, we evaluate the aver-
age payoff P¯Sx of those players who adopt the same strategy
Sx, as well as the average payoff P¯S¯x of those players who
adopt the opposite strategy S¯x of player x, if any, within the
neighborhood. In particular, we have
P¯Sx =
∑
z∈Γ(x)
Pzδ(S¯
T
x Sz) + Px
∑
z∈Γ(x)
δ(S¯Tx Sz) + 1
(7)
and
P¯S¯x =
∑
z∈Γ(x)
Pzδ(S
T
x SZ)
∑
z∈Γ(x)
δ(STx SZ)
, (8)
where the Dirac delta function δ(x) satisfies
δ(x) =
{
0, if x 6= 0
1, if x = 0
.
Lastly, player x will adopt the strategy S¯x with the probability
T (P¯S¯x − P¯Sx) =
1
1 + exp[−(P¯S¯x − P¯Sx)/K]
, (9)
where K is, as by pairwise imitation, the uncertainty by strat-
egy adoptions.
The presented simulation results were obtained by using
L = 100− 400 depending on the proximity to phase separa-
tion lines and the size of the emerging spatial patterns. In ac-
cordance with the random sequential update, each full Monte
Carlo step, which consists of repeating the elementary steps
L×L times corresponding to all players, gives a chance once
on average for every player to alter its strategy. The stationary
frequency of cooperators ρC is determined by averaging over
104 Monte Carlo steps in the stationary state after sufficiently
long relaxation times. In general, the stationary state has been
considered to be reached when the average of the cooperation
level becomes time-independent. To further increase the ac-
curacy of our simulations, we have averaged the final outcome
over 50 independent initial conditions.
Pair approximations
Let pC and pD = 1 − pC denote the frequencies of co-
operators and defectors, respectively, and let pCC , pCD, pDC
and pDD represent the frequencies of CC, CD, DC and DD
pairs, respectively. Then qX|Y = pXY /pY with X,Y ∈ C,D
specifies the conditional probability to find an X-player given
that the neighboring node is occupied by an Y -player. Note
that here X , Y and Z denote either C or D. Instead of the
first-order approximation considering the frequency of strate-
gies as in the well-mixed population, the pair approximation
tracks the frequencies of strategy pairs pXY (X,Y ∈ C,D).
The probabilities of larger configurations are approximated
by the frequencies of configurations not more complex than
pairs. Based on the compatibility condition pX =
∑
Y pXY ,
the symmetry condition pXY = pYX , and closure conditions,
pC and pCC can fully determine the dynamics of the system.
While the pair approximation for pairwise imitation is well-
known and can be looked up for example in the Appendix of
[7] or more recently [78], for the imitation based on local in-
fluence the derivations are as follows.
A defector is selected for strategy updating with the prob-
ability pD. Let kC and kD denote the number of cooperators
and defectors amongst the neighbors on a regular lattice with
degree k, respectively. The frequency of such a configuration
is
k!
kC !kD!
qkC
C|Dq
kD
D|D, (10)
and the payoff of the defector is PD(kC , kD) = (1+ r) ·kC +
r·kD . The configuration probability with which a neighboring
cooperator has k′C cooperators and k
′
D defectors as its neigh-
bors is
(k − 1)!
k
′
C !k
′
D!
q
k
′
C
C|CDq
k
′
D
D|CD, (11)
where qX|Y Z gives the conditional probability that a player
next to the Y Z pair is in state X . The payoff of the neighbor-
ing cooperator is PC(k
′
C , k
′
D) = k
′
C . Similarly, the configu-
ration probability with which a neighboring defector has k′C
cooperators and k′D defectors as its neighbors is
(k − 1)!
k
′
C !k
′
D!
q
k
′
C
C|DDq
k
′
D
D|DD, (12)
and the payoff of the neighboring defector is PD(k
′
C , k
′
D) =
(1 + r) · k
′
C + r · (k
′
D + 1). Thus, the average payoff P¯C of
cooperators that are neighbors of the focal defector is
P¯C =
k−1∑
k
′
C
=0
(k−1)!
k
′
C
!k
′
D
!
q
k
′
C
C|CDq
k
′
D
D|CD·PC(k
′
C , k
′
D)
= (k − 1) · qC|CD.
(13)
The average payoff P¯D of defectors that are neighbors of the
focal defector, on the other hand, is
P¯D =
kD ·
k−1∑
k
′
C
=0
(k−1)!
k
′
C
!k
′
D
!
q
k
′
C
C|DD
q
k
′
D
D|DD
·PD(k
′
C
,k
′
D
)+PD(kC ,kD)
kD+1
=
kD ·[(k−1)·qC|DD+rk]+rk+kC
kD+1
.
(14)
Consequently, pC increases by 1/N where N = L2, with
probability
Pr ob(∆pC =
1
N
) =
pD ·
k∑
kC=1
k!
kC !kD !
qkC
C|Dq
kD
D|D · T (P¯C − P¯D),
(15)
7where T (P¯C − P¯D) is the individual transition probability
given by Eq. 9. The number of CC pairs increases by kC ,
and thus pCC increases by 2kC/(kN) with probability
Pr ob(∆pCC =
2kC
kN
) =
pD ·
k!
kC !kD !
qkC
C|Dq
kD
D|D · T (P¯C − P¯D).
(16)
A cooperator, on the other hand, is selected for strategy up-
dating with the probability pC . The frequency of a configu-
ration that there are kC cooperators and kD defectors in the
neighborhood of the focal cooperator is
k!
kC !kD!
qkC
C|Cq
kD
D|C , (17)
and the payoff of the focal cooperator is PC(kC , kD) = kC .
The configuration probability with which a neighboring coop-
erator has k′C cooperators and k
′
D defectors as its neighbors
is
(k − 1)!
k
′
C !k
′
D!
q
k
′
C
C|CCq
k
′
D
D|CC , (18)
and the payoff of the neighboring cooperator is
PC(k
′
C , k
′
D) = k
′
C + 1. Similarly, the configuration
probability with which a neighboring defector has k′C
cooperators and k′D defectors as its neighbors is
(k − 1)!
k
′
C !k
′
D!
q
k
′
C
C|DCq
k
′
D
D|DC , (19)
and the payoff of the neighboring defector is PD(k
′
C , k
′
D) =
(1 + r) · (k
′
C + 1) + rk
′
D . Thus the average payoff P¯C of
cooperators in the neighborhood of the focal cooperator is
P¯C =
kC ·
k−1∑
k
′
C
=0
(k−1)!
k
′
C
!k
′
D
!
q
k
′
C
C|CC
q
k
′
D
D|CC
·PC(k
′
C
,k
′
D
)+PC(kC ,kD)
kC+1
=
kC ·[(k−1)·qC|CC+2]
kC+1
,
(20)
while, the average payoff P¯D of defectors in the neighborhood
of the focal cooperator is
P¯D =
k−1∑
k
′
C
=0
(k−1)!
k
′
C
!k
′
D
!
q
k
′
C
C|DCq
k
′
D
D|DC ·PD(k
′
C , k
′
D)
= (k − 1) · qC|DC + 1 + rk.
(21)
Thus pC decreases by 1/N with probability
Pr ob(∆pC = −
1
N
) =
pC ·
k−1∑
kC=0
k!
kC !kD!
qkC
C|Cq
kD
D|C · T (P¯D − P¯C).
(22)
Moreover, the number of CC pairs decreases by kC and thus
pCC decreases by 2kC/(kN) with probability
Pr ob(∆pCC = −
2kC
kN
) =
pC ·
k!
kC !kD !
qkC
C|Cq
kD
D|C · T (P¯D − P¯C).
(23)
These derivations lead us to the master equations
p˙C = Prob(∆pC =
1
N
)− Pr ob(∆pC = −
1
N
) and (24)
p˙CC =
k∑
kC=0
2kC
k
[Pr ob(∆pCC =
2kC
kN
)− Pr ob(∆pCC = −
2kC
kN
)]. (25)
Although these equations are per derivation exact, they do
depend on the density of triplet configurations which are
outside their scope. Thus, in order to “close” the system of
differential equations, the triplet configuration probabilities
have to be approximated by probabilities of configurations
that are not more complex than pairs. Note that by using
different closure conditions, we can in general obtain different
pair approximations. Here we employ the so-called ordinary
pair approximation method, where only the first-order pair
correlations are considered. We thus have qX|Y Z ≈ qX|Y .
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